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Let’s
stipulate two things: First, there were never any easy American choices in Syria. Second,
the Obama administration got virtually every hard choice wrong. Or, to be more
precise, the choices it did make did nothing to either stop the worst
humanitarian catastrophe in the new century or block our enemies and rivals, Iran and Russia,
from exerting their will in Syria.
The result
is the Syria
we have today, a patchwork quilt of competing zones of control that in some
ways looks more complicated than it is. Let’s make sense of the map below:
syria-battle-map.jpg The red, government-controlled areas represent the most
populated and economically consequential sections of the country.
This is
where Russia and Iran have
asserted their will, and this is where Assad is spilling the blood of innocents
to expand and maintain his grip on power. Yes, he’s still opposed by rebel
groups, but they’ve been decimated, and many of the groups that remain are
dominated by jihadists.
In the
north, our Kurdish allies are on the move, but not against the regime — against
ISIS. In other words, Assad has beaten his
main foe and is leaving the United States,
the Kurds, and assorted other allies to deal with our main foe, ISIS. After the battle for Raqqa, Syria
is likely to be effectively partitioned, with American-backed forces
controlling the north, the Russian-backed regime controlling the west, and some
small forces still battling it out on the borders.
As we
confront the Assad regime’s gas attack — which is just one of its countless
violations of the law of war, and hardly its most deadly — we also have to
confront this core reality: Our leading geopolitical rival — a traditional
great power and a nuclear superpower — has quite obviously decided that the
survival of a friendly regime in Damascus is a core national interest. It acted
decisively while we dithered, and it has boots on the ground.
Thus, we
now face a quandary. Retaliate against Syria
so strongly that it truly punishes and weakens Assad, and you risk threatening Russia’s vital
interests. Respond with a pinprick strike that Russia effectively “permits,” and
you do nothing important. Assad has demonstrated that he cares little about his
own casualties and may (like many other American enemies before him) actually
feel emboldened after “surviving” an American strike.
Let me add
one other thing. On this, the 100th anniversary of America’s entry into World
War I, it’s worth noting that outside the ever-shrinking number of World War II
veterans, this nation has no memory of what great-power conflict is like.
Considering whether to strike a close Russian ally is not like considering
whether to drone a terrorist camp in rural Pakistan or raid an al-Qaeda village
in the Yemeni countryside.
Even a
single skirmish with a nation like Russia
could inflict more American casualties in one day than, say, the last few years
of combined military operations in Afghanistan,
Iraq,
and elsewhere. That doesn’t mean we should operate from a posture of fear and
timidity but rather from one of sobriety and wisdom. It also means that if we
choose to escalate our military operations — to directly strike where Russia
has planted its flag — then the American people need to have their voice heard,
through their elected representatives.
We should
not stumble our way into conflict. We should not lash out in anger and rage (no
matter how justified) without carefully considering our strategy. There are
those who say, “Putin wouldn’t dare oppose us,” and they may well be right. But
mights and maybes are thin assurances when the stakes are this high, and
striking Assad is hardly our only option.
We can
follow through with our commitment to defeat ISIS,
then help our allies consolidate control in the north, limiting Assad to his
rump state in the west. We can facilitate the creation of safe zones where
refugees can live free from fear of Assad’s gas and cluster bombs.

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